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NONNA MAYER
Is France racist, as Michel Wieviorka has suggested in a recent book?1 And if so,
why? Is France more or less racist than her European neighbours, and is the degree
of racism increasing or decreasing? These questions are being hotly debated in the
wake of the electoral successes of the National Front, which is seen as a 'racist' party
by three-quarters of French people old enough to vote.2
Defining racism
The word 'racism' itself requires definition.3 Firstly, it can be applied to the theories
of such late nineteenth-century thinkers as Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Joseph
Arthur de Gobineau and Georges Vacher de Lapouge, who postulated that different
races were unequal on biological criteria. The anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss
condensed their opinions into four basic points:
One: there is a correlation between genetic inheritance on the one hand, and intellectual
aptitude and moral tendencies on the other. Two: this inheritance, which governs the
aptitudes and tendencies, is common to all members of certain human groups. Three: these
groups, or 'races', may be ranked according to their genetic inheritance. Four: these
differences entitle the 'races' which are held to be superior to rule and exploit the others, and
potentially to destroy them.4
Since then progress in haematological and genetic research has proved that these
theories have no foundation, and UNESCO has more than once solemnly pro-
claimed that there are no different human 'races'. The very use of the word is now
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controversial, as shown by a recent conference entitled 'Ought the Word "Race" to
be Eliminated from the French Constitution?'.5 But everyday use of the word takes
no account of scientific progress or semantic subtleties. Hence 'racism' is used
indifferently to denote any kind of exclusion: it can be anti-immigrant, anti-youth,
anti-women, anti-police, even anti-French.6
In this article I shall use it in the more restrictive and less controversial sense of
'ethnocentrism'. This means the tendency in all societies, in all ages, to esteem the
group to which one personally belongs and reject 'outsiders'. As Levi-Strauss has
emphasised, it is
the oldest attitude, and has solid psychological foundations since it tends to resurface in any
one of us when we find ourselves in an unexpected situation [which] makes us purely and
simply repudiate cultural forms — moral, religious and social — which are the most unlike
those we identify with. 'What savagery!', 'It would never happen at home', 'It shouldn't be
allowed', etc.: crude reactions which express that shudder of repulsion when we are con-
fronted with ways of living, believing and thinking which are alien to us.7
Attempts to measure ethnocentrism
A survey conducted just after the French presidential election of 1988 gives some
idea of the scale of the phenomenon. It asked four questions about the place of
minorities in France, and their rights.8 Of those interviewed, twenty one per cent
thought that 'Jews have too much power in France', thirty-eight per cent did not
think it 'all right' for 'Muslims living in France to have a mosque in which to
practise their religion', half had a vague feeling that 'we don't feel the country
belongs to us any more' and two-thirds thought that 'there are too many immi-
grants in France'. The answers to these four questions are closely interconnected.
Rejection of Jews is essentially similar to rejection of Muslims, immigrants and,
more generally, anyone who is 'different'. They all spring from one and the same
'ethnocentrist' attitude. They do, however, supply the elements for a progressive
scale of ethnocentrism, and so make it possible to measure its intensity and
frequency among the French population.
The survey revealed that the highest degree of ethnocentrism was represented by
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anti-Semitism — a modern version of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.9 People
who thought the Jews had too much power were consistently hostile to the building
of mosques for Muslims, didn't feel the country belonged to them any more and
thought there were too many immigrants in France. On the other hand, the most
widespread, but the mildest, degree of ethnocentrism was hostility to immigrants;
not all who expressed it gave an ethnocentrist reply to the other questions. The
'score' of each individual on this scale corresponded to the number of ethnocentrist
replies, from o to those who gave none to 4 for those who gave all four. If we set
down as 'ethnocentrist' those who scored 2 or higher, then in 1988 they represented
slightly over half of all French people old enough to vote.10
These figures are confirmed by a more recent study by Roland Cayrol, based
on surveys of 'The French People, Racism and the Struggle against Racism'
commissioned by the National Consultative Commission on the Rights of Man as
part of its annual report on 'The Struggle against Racism and Xenophobia'. Using
about one hundred questions relating to immigrants, foreigners and minorities, he
classified respondents into six groups, from the 'militant anti-racists', who were
most tolerant of all kinds of minorities, to 'convinced racists'.11 If we add to the
latter those whose opinions are less clear but who are 'tinged with racism', the
proportion of 'racists' in the wider sense is about fifty-five per cent — comparable to
that revealed by the survey conducted by CEVIPOF (the Centre d'Etude de la Vie
Politique Francaise).
Explanations for ethnocentrism
There are various ways of explaining these attitudes. The first, in the line of classic
studies by Adorno and Allport,12 stresses psycho-social factors. It sees ethnocentrism
as a reaction to frustration going back to early childhood or arising from difficult
working or living conditions. It is indeed in the more deprived social milieus —
unskilled or manual workers and the unemployed — that racism and ethnocentrism
are most widespread. The second explanation lays more stress on the cognitive
origins of the problem, seeing it as a result of ignorance, combined with lack of
9
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Table i. Dislike of minorities: 'What do you feel about the following groups? Do you
feel a good deal of liking, some liking, some dislike or a good deal of dislike?'
% dislike
North Africans
Beurs
Gypsies
Blacks
Pieds Noirs*
Jews
Asians
Antilleans
Southern Europeans
Total
42
35
36
18
19
16
17
9
7
FN sympathisers
94
83
67
54
49
47
42
24
22
2 — 1
+ 52
+ 48
+ 31
+ 36
+ 30
+ 31
+ 25
+ 15
+ 15
* Former Algerian colonists resettled in France.
CSA/Commission Consultative des Droits de l'Homme, 15—23 November 1994.
education and social and cultural isolation.13 This view is supported by the fact that
the frequency of racist responses is inversely proportional to educational level: the
least well qualified are the most intolerant. The third stresses the ideological and
political convictions which encourage racism. In France today, by far the greatest
intolerance is shown by those who vote for or sympathise with the National Front.
Among declared Le Pen supporters, the level of antipathy to all minorities is twice
or three times greater than average, reaching record heights with regard to North
Africans (+ 52 points) and Beurs (+ 48 points) (see Table i).14 They are also the only
group which openly and overwhelmingly describes itself as racist (Table 2).15 It is
hardly surprising to find that the chief vehicle of racism in France is a party which,
ever since its foundation in 1972, has used immigrants as the universal scapegoat and
built its agenda round 'national preference', with a leader who describes the gas
chambers as 'a minor sideline in the history of World War II'.
Ethnocentrism in a European Context
Does France have a higher level of ethnocentrism than her European neighbours?
Comparisons of this kind can be tricky: definitions, approaches to the subject and
13
 See Gertrude J. Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, The Tenacity of Prejudice. Antisemitism in
Contemporary America (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).
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 A slang word for an Arab, applied to children of immigrants from North Africa who were born
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15
 ' Would you say that you personally are quite racist ( + + ) , a bit racist ( + ) , not very racist (—) or not at
all racist (—)?'
+ + + — no answer
NF sympathisers (percentage) 64 22 10 o 4
Total sample 12 28 25 31 4
CSA Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme, November 1994.
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Table 2. Changes in the perception of people of another nationality: 'Generally speaking,
how do you feel about the numbers of people of another nationality living in our country:
are there too many, a lot but not too many, or not many?'
% too many
Belgium
Denmark
W. Germany
E. Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
UK
EC
1988
43
36
48
—
19
17
45
7
34
30
30
45
37
1991
56
43
58
45
29
25
56
1 2
63
2 0
44
18
54
50
1992
53
46
57
48
45
23
52
11
65
32
49
28
50
50
1993
54
43
60
57
57
25
56
8
64
2 1
47
25
52
53
1994
57
41
40
40
64
27
55
8
46
23
47
30
42
43
Eurobarometers 30/35/37/39/42, in Anna Melich, 'Comparative European Trend Survey
Data on Recism and Xenophobia', ECPR/Bordeaux, 27 April-2 May 1995.
ways of measuring vary from country to country. Even if we confine ourselves to
analysing the racial prejudices revealed by opinion polls, the questions asked and the
way of asking them are seldom identical. The survey launched by the European
Commission in 1988 is a fortunate exception to this rule. The Commission, worried
by the rise of racism and xenophobia, began a poll among residents of all twelve EC
countries, examining their opinions on the rights of man, immigration policies and
the foreigners among them. Using the results we can, for the first time, make a
systematic comparison.16 A sizeable proportion of those questioned felt that there
were too many people in their country who were of 'another' nationality, race,
culture, religion or social class. Just over half the sample (51 per cent) thought that at
least one of those groups was too large, and almost a quarter (23 per cent) thought
that at least three of them were. It will be seen that this estimate of average levels of
intolerance roughly corresponds to those in France. Not only does the average level
of racism seem to be similar in France and in the Community as a whole, but it
correlates with the same social, cultural and political factors, particularly educational
levels and political beliefs.
This European average is deceptive. The level of intolerance varies from one
country to another, according to levels of industrialisation, history of migration and
the size of the immigrant population. The countries divide into two distinct groups,
16
 Opinion poll of a sample of the adult population (aged 15 and over) of the twelve EC countries:
11,795 persons were interviewed at home by experienced pollsters as part of the Eurobarometer 30
scheme. The results were published as Eurobarometre. L'opinion publique dans la Communauti europienne.
Racisme et xenophobie (Brussels: Commission des Communautes Europeennes, 1989).
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Table 3. Index of xenophobia by country*
Greece 34
Belgium 22
France 20
Denmark 18
Germany 13
UK 13
Italy 11
Netherlands 11
Luxembourg 9
Portugal 9
Spain 7
Ireland 5
EC 14
The value ' + ' corresponds to respondents who agree with at least two of the following
statements: there are too many people of another nationality/the presence of people from
another nationality (another race) is disturbing (Eurobarometer 42, 1994/in Anna Melich,
'Comparative European Trend Survey Data on Racism and Xenophobia', ECPR/Bordeaux,
27 April-2 May 1995).
whatever the indicator used. It is in the countries with the largest numbers of
immigrants — France, Germany, Britain, Belgium and, to a lesser extent, Denmark
— that rejection of foreigners and minorities is most marked, Holland being a
notable exception. The southern European countries with high levels of emigration
(Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal), together with Ireland, appear more tolerant.
This distinction is now becoming blurred, however. As countries with tradi-
tionally high levels of emigration begin to receive immigrants in their turn,
attitudes and behaviour towards foreigners begin to change. For the first time there
have been racist incidents in Spain, Portugal and Italy,17 and recent 'Eurobarometer'
surveys have shown that levels of xenophobia in southern Europe are catching up
with and even overtaking those in the north (Tables 2 and 3).18
Not only do intolerance levels differ among the EC countries: the groups which
suffer from it are also different. The 1989 survey is particularly interesting in this
connection because it uses open questions, asking respondents what comes to mind
when they think of a person of 'another' race, nationality, religion etc. As far as
'nationality' is concerned, the French immediately think of North Africans, the
British of Asians and the Germans of Turks, while southern Europeans give more
17
 On Italy in particular see Michel Wieviorka, ed., Racisme et xenophobic en Europe. Une
comparaison internationale (Paris: La Decouverte, 1994).
18
 For an overview of Eurobarometers from 1988 to 1994 see the paper by Anne Melich,
'Comparative European Trend Survey Data on Racism and Xenophobia', given at the European
Consortium for Political Research workshop on 'Racist Parties in Europe: A New Political Family',
Bordeaux, 27 April-2 May 1995. For a detailed analysis of the Italian, French, German, Belgian and
Austrian evidence see also the paper by Gilles Ivaldi, 'Cognitive Structures of Xenophobic Attitudes
among Supporters of Extreme Right-wing Parties in Europe', ibid.
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varied responses relating mostly to other Europeans. In terms of race, the group
most often mentioned is blacks. But French and British responses are once again
conditioned by their colonial history: the former mention Arabs, the latter Indians
and Pakistanis. The most frequently mentioned religion — by more than half of all
French and Belgian respondents and over seventy per cent of Dutch, Danish and
German — is Islam. But the southern countries and Luxembourg give priority to
Jehovah's Witnesses and Christian Scientists, while in Ireland, for obvious reasons,
'the others' are the Protestants — and in mainland Britain Catholics are mentioned
almost as often as Muslims.
Racism in new clothes
Racism varies not only through space but also through time. If we look at trends in
responses over a long period it seems, paradoxically, as if racism and ethnocentrism
are on the decrease. This is particularly striking with regard to anti-semitism. In
France since the Liberation, surveys have shown the Jews becoming more and more
socially and politically integrated. Overt hostility and a feeling that Jews are
different have almost disappeared, as has dislike of the idea of Jews holding high
public office — including the presidency.19
The same applies to views on immigrants. The percentage of French non-
Muslims who say they are not 'hostile' to the idea of a near relation (brother, sister,
child) marrying a Muslim rose from 49 per cent to 59 per cent in five years. The
percentage who would not object to a Muslim being elected mayor of a commune
rose from 28 per cent to 42 per cent over the same period.20
This does not, however, mean that ethnocentrism and anti-semitism have
disappeared: they have changed and shifted their ground. As the National Front rose
in electoral favour and commenced attacks on the 'Jewish lobby', the feeling that
'Jews have too much power in France' began to affect one French voter in every
five. As 'negationist' theories (denial of the Holocaust) began to gain ground, the
idea that 'there was too much harping on' the Nazi extermination of the Jews
during the Second World War advanced along with it. And a lively debate has
arisen over the cultural differences ascribed to Islam, which is identified with
fanaticism and extremism.
Here again, the development is not unique to France. Many studies have brought
out the development of new forms of racism in the United States, which may be
described as 'subtle', 'indirect' or 'symbolic'.21 The more overt manifestations of
19
 See N o n n a Mayer , 'L 'ant isemit isme francais a l 'aune des sondages ' , in Michel Wiev io rka ,
Racisme et modernite" (thereafter Wiev io rka , Racisme et modernite) (Paris: La Decouver te , 1992), 278—88.
20
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Marche du siecle and R T L , 20—21 Sept. 1994: Le Monde, 13 O c t . 1994.
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versus Racial Threa ts to the G o o d Life', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol . 40 (1981),
4 1 4 - 3 1 ; Dav id O . Sears, ' Symbol i c Rac i sm ' , in Phyllis A . Katz and Dalmas A. Tay lo r , eds., Eliminating
Racism: Profile in Controversy ( N e w Y o r k : P l enum, 1988), 53-84; T h o m a s F. Pe t t ig rew, ' T h e N a t u r e of
M o d e r n R a c i s m in the U n i t e d States', Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale, Vol . 2, n o . 3 (1989),
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racial prejudice, evoking the presumed physical, moral or intellectual inferiority of
minorities or implying a refusal to grant them equal rights, are on the decrease. But
at the same time the idea is spreading, even among prosperous and cultured people,
that minorities have no respect for fundamental American values, and there is
growing distrust of policies designed to fight effectively against discrimination.
With regard to France, studies by Pierre-Andre Taguieff relating to the ideological
offensive by the New Right have revealed a change from anti-egalitarian racism on
biological grounds to differential racism on cultural grounds.22
It was changes of this kind which were sought by another comparative survey
conducted in France, Germany, Holland and the UK, the results of which are worth
mentioning.23 The authors distinguished two scales of racism. The first was based
on questions relating to hostility to minorities and reluctance to mix with them: this
the authors called 'blatant racism'. Respondents who scored highly on this scale
thought that foreigners were dishonest, not very bright, likely to abuse the welfare
system and fiddle unemployment benefit, etc., and refused to have anything to do
with them — marry or have sex with a foreigner, work for a foreign boss, etc.
The second related to 'subtle racism'. Those who scored highly on this scale were
more likely to think that foreigners in their country did not respect traditional
values (hard work, social ambition etc.), and exaggerated cultural differences of
language, religion or sexuality. They might not admit to negative feelings about
foreigners, but they were less likely to express positive feelings such as sympathy or
admiration.
By combining the scores on both scales, the authors divided the sample into three
groups. At one extreme were the convinced anti-racists, 'equalitarians', who had
low scores on both scales; at the other, the 'bigots' with the highest scores on both
scales. In between was the third group, the 'subtle racists' who had low scores on the
blatant-racism scale but high scores on the subtle racism. Their attitude confirmed
the idea that a degree of anti-racism has become the norm in the Western
democracies since the war. To a certain extent this group had interiorised the norm:
they were against racism and did not see themselves as racist. Their attitude could be
seen as a milder, attenuated version of the racist phenomenon.
With a problem as complex as this, the limitations of the survey methods are
obvious. They record only stated opinions, and actions do not always match
words.24 Surveys register opinions at a certain point in time, and opinions tend to be
and Jeanne Ben Brika, 'Le rejet de l'autre: purete, descendance, valeurs', in Mart ine Fourier and
Genevieve Vermes , eds, Ethnicisation des rapports sociaux (Saint-Cloud/Paris: E N S Editions Fontenay
Saint -Cloud/Edi t ions de l 'Harmat t an , Paris, 1994), 196-235.
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volatile (see Tables 2 and 3). They assemble a large number of individual opinions
without regard to the environment of the individuals concerned and their social,
professional and residential contacts with minorities. Despite these limitations, they
do introduce a degree of objectivity into what is a highly emotive debate, and they
do reveal some common elements in contemporary expressions of racism.
There is a certain consistency among the stated opinions on minorities: they
spring from the same ethnocentrist attitude. Everywhere the same sodo-cultural
factors engender the same prejudices, especially financial insecurity and poor
education. They are everywhere sustained by the same extremist and xenophobic
ideologies which help to legitimise and normalise racism, preached by parties such as
the National Front in France, the Vlaams Blok in Belgium and the Republikaner in
Germany.
However, it is worth noting that the electoral successes of these parties do not
correspond exactly to the level of ethnocentrism in the country concerned. France
here is typical: in the first round of the presidential election in April 1995 the
National Front scored a record fifteen per cent of votes, whereas the level of
xenophobia in France, as measured by the latest Eurobarometer (Table 3) is lower
than in Greece or Belgium and comparable to that in Denmark, where no
right-wing party has ever enjoyed a similar success. Le Pen's party does well not
because the French are more racist than their neighbours but because of the
economic and political state of France in the 1980s, because the other parties could
not agree on a strategy to deal with the Front and because of the latter's own
political resources — leadership, organisation and agenda.25
Taking a long-term view, advances in education and anti-racist legislation seem
at last to be muting the expression of anti-minority prejudices, which are being
reformulated in terms of cultural differences rather than race or skin colour. But this
does not mean that the symbolic barriers which isolate cultural, national and
religious minorities are in the process of disappearing. They are merely different.
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